12.04 Zaproszenie na wykład dr. Milana Jovanovića

Zaproszenie na wykład dr. Milana Jovanovića

poniedziałek 12 kwietnia o g. 17.00 na platformie Zoom

Serdecznie zapraszamy na wykład dr. Milana Jovanovića z Uniwersytetu w Niszu

How to (Over)Charitably Interpret Influence Theory of

Causation,… and Still Refute it

Szczegóły spotkania:
Topic: Milan Jovanović, How to (Over)Charitably Interpret Influence Theory of Causation
Time: Apr 12, 2021 05:00 PM Warsaw
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Tomasz Bigaj
Mariusz Grygianiec
Marcin Poręba

How to (Over)Charitably Interpret Influence 

Theory of Causation, … and Still Refute It

Faced with the seemingly unsolvable problem of late preemption, David Lewis had abandoned his original counterfactual analysis and formulated a new theory of causation (Lewis 2000, 2004). In that theory, causation is defined as an ancestral of influence relation. The definition of influence, on the other hand, is a complex thesis about the relation between events in terms of counterfactual dependence between their alterations. The controversial bit is that the definition involves vague qualifications such as “substantial range” and “not too distant”, which substantially affect the interpretation and the plausibility of the theory. Furthermore, although causation is typically understood as an all-or-nothing relation, the relation of influence is defined in such a way that admits of degree. This talk investigates whether introducing a specific kind of relativity into the influence theory of causation (ITC) can help to solve the problems of ITC and save it from various counterexamples (CEs)

After introducing the theory and pointing out the problems described above (within the first part of the talk), I will proceed by examining Schaffer’s and Bigaj’s interpretation and, consequently, their offered CEs to the ITC (Schaffer 2001, Bigaj 2012). The aim of that (second) part of my talk is to show how an advocate of ITC – due to the vague qualifications in the core of the theory – still has enough room to escape those CEs. In order to avoid potentially problematic commitment to the specific resolution of the given vague phrases within the definition of vagueness, I’ll then offer what I consider to be the most charitable reading of the theory. I propose that the vague phrases “not too distant” and “substantial range” should be read in a less strict, situation-sensitive, variable way.

In the third part of the presentation, I will directly address the problem of gradability of influence. I will argue that there is a natural maneuver to avoid counterintuitive comparability of causation (in the cases of late preemption) while still permitting the degree-based influence. More precisely, if we don’t want ITC to identify preempted alternatives as “less of a cause” of a given effect, we might want to allow for a context-sensitive threshold for what counts as a cause. This strategy is closely related to the “winner takes it all” interpretation of ITC (suggested in Kvart 2001) and can play in favor of ITC in the light of the aforementioned CEs.

Still, all these moves are forcing moves, and – as usual – they don’t get us out of the trouble, but instead lead us to a new undesirable position. Adopting an influence threshold (that varies situationally) within ITC creates, as I will argue, a new problem for the theory – a problem with certain cases of joint causation. The adopted threshold, in a given context, can force the analysis to disregard some of the legitimate joint causes simply because they influence the effect less than required.

Finally, based on this diagnosis, I will present a scenario for CEs to the proposed (most charitable) reading of ITC that combines joint causation and preemption. What makes this scenario effective is that it can easily be modeled in such a manner to put (in the same context) the mutually inconsistent restrictions on how to set up the threshold. Consequently, this shows that all proposed efforts to save ITC ultimately fail.

Keywords: causation, influence, vagueness, preemption, joint causation.

About me:

I am a teaching assistant at the Department of philosophy, University of Niš. In December 2020, I have defended my Ph.D. thesis (title: “Causation, Conditionals and Pluralism”, supervisor: Dr Miljana Milojević) at the University of Belgrade. 

My recent publications (Theoria, Philosophical Studies, Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy) are mostly connected to the topic of my dissertation and, hence, primarily concerned with Russell’s critique of causal realism, causal pluralism, problems with the influence theory of causation, and so on. Also, I have written a few papers dealing with the different topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. I also have (a newfound) interest in the philosophy of education and methods of teaching philosophy.