18.03 Odczyt w ramach seminarium ZJR: Does understanding human action require attributing propositional attitudes?
Zapraszamy na kolejny odczyt w ramach seminarium ZJR.
18 III 2022, godz. 17.00
Emma Borg
(University of Reading)
(University of Reading)
wygłosi odczyt:
Does understanding human action require attributing propositional attitudes?
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The next meeting of the Sign-Language-Reality seminar will take place this Friday, 18 III 2022, 17.00, Central European Time.
Emma Borg
(University of Reading)
(University of Reading)
will deliver a talk:
Does understanding human action require attributing propositional attitudes?
ABSTRACT
A standard view in philosophy – known as ‘folk’ or ‘common-sense’ psychology – holds that we understand and predict the actions of others by first attributing suitable mental states to them (including propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires) and then reasoning about what actions those mental states should lead to in the target’s environment. I can make sense of Maya’s reaching behaviour because I take her to want a cookie and to believe there is a cookie in the jar. Recently, however, this common-sense model has come under significant pressure from alternative views which provide more deflationary approaches (taking action understanding to involve attributing simpler mental states, or perhaps only sensitivity to non-mental states). This paper explores the arguments against the common-sense model and the viability of the alternative approaches. I argue that, while some kind of pluralism about the methods involved in action understanding is probably right, this should be seen (contra some theorists) as supplementing not supplanting common-sense psychology.
A standard view in philosophy – known as ‘folk’ or ‘common-sense’ psychology – holds that we understand and predict the actions of others by first attributing suitable mental states to them (including propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires) and then reasoning about what actions those mental states should lead to in the target’s environment. I can make sense of Maya’s reaching behaviour because I take her to want a cookie and to believe there is a cookie in the jar. Recently, however, this common-sense model has come under significant pressure from alternative views which provide more deflationary approaches (taking action understanding to involve attributing simpler mental states, or perhaps only sensitivity to non-mental states). This paper explores the arguments against the common-sense model and the viability of the alternative approaches. I argue that, while some kind of pluralism about the methods involved in action understanding is probably right, this should be seen (contra some theorists) as supplementing not supplanting common-sense psychology.
The meeting will be organized via Google Meet and will be open to all who are interested.
The list of this year seminar meetings is available at:
http://pts.edu.pl/seminarium-
http://pts.edu.pl/seminarium-
Sign-Language-Reality seminars are organized jointly by the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw and Polish Semiotic Society.